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Abstract
The police lineup is a common tool for eyewitness identifications of suspects in criminal cases. Forensic DNA
testing of people convicted by eyewitness identification evidence and field studies of police lineups, however,
have revealed that mistaken identification from lineups is not uncommon. Controlled laboratory experiments
have isolated numerous variables that contribute to mistaken identifications from lineups, some of which are
controllable by the criminal justice system (e.g., various biases in the lineup or its procedure) and some of
which are not controllable by the criminal justice system (e.g., witnessing conditions, stress).
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The police lineup is a common tool for trying to
establish the identity of the perpetrator of a crime.
A lineup is likely to be used when there was at
least one eyewitness (see Eyewitness Testimony)
who observed the culprit committing the crime (or
observed someone just before or just after the crime
was committed who was likely to have been the
culprit). When police investigators have a suspect in
the crime, that person or his/her photo is shown to
the eyewitness to see if the eyewitness will identify
that person as the culprit. Because showing only one
person (or one photo) is considered a suggestive
procedure, the suspect (or his photo) is embedded
among other people (or photos of other people).
These other people (or their photos) are not suspects
and are called fillers. This array of people (or photos)
is generally called a lineup. The eyewitness is then
asked if she/he recognizes anyone in the lineup as
having been the culprit. Photographic lineups are
much more common than are live lineups, and the
number of lineup members typically ranges from
six to eight. A positive identification of someone
from a lineup can be a very powerful form of
evidence, commonly resulting in arrest, indictment,
and ultimate conviction.
The Development of a Science of Lineups
Behavioral scientists have conducted hundreds of
experiments, starting in the mid- to late 1970s,
in which unsuspecting people have viewed simu-
lated crimes followed by lineups. On the basis of
these experiments, scientists have published several
hundred articles warning that the risk of eyewitnesses
identifying innocent people is much higher than most
people seem to believe. The rate of mistaken identifi-
cation is not a constant number but instead varies as
a function of dozens of factors. These include factors
that are not under the control of the criminal justice
system (such as witness viewing conditions, stress,
and whether the witness and culprit are of the same
race or not), which are called estimator variables.
However, the rate of mistaken identification also
includes factors that are directly under the control of
the criminal justice system (such as prelineup instruc-
tions to the eyewitness, the choice of fillers used in
the lineup, and cues from the lineup administrator
that can influence the eyewitness), which are called
system variables [1]. Psychological scientists have
taken a special interest in system variables because
of the potential to use system variables to reduce the
chances of mistaken identification.
Although the early eyewitness identification litera-
ture drew the attention and respect of many psycho-
logical scientists, it was not until the mid- to late
1990s that the legal system began to take signif-
icant notice. It was at this time that the advent
of forensic DNA testing helped uncover wrongful
convictions that had resulted from mistaken eyewit-
ness identification. In 1996, a US Justice Department
report on the first 28 DNA exonerations revealed
that 24 were cases of mistaken eyewitness identi-
fication [2]. By 2007, the number of DNA-based
exonerations of individuals who were convicted by
juries stood at more than 200, and over 75% of those
were cases of mistaken eyewitness identification (see
www.innocenceproject.org for an up-to-date Internet
site that tracks these cases). These DNA exonerations
have resulted in greater communication between the
justice system and the psychological science on the
problem of mistaken identification.
Causes of Misidentification in Lineups
Researchers have discovered a large number of
factors that contribute to eyewitness misidentification.
Some of these factors are relatively obvious in the
sense that they represent conditions of witnessing that
are not conducive to forming a good memory of the
facial characteristics of the perpetrator, such as poor
lighting, distant viewing, short exposure durations to
the perpetrator’s face, and the use of disguises by the
perpetrator.
Other factors might be less obvious, such as the
stress and fear that sometimes accompany witnessing
a crime. Surveys suggest that many people believe
that stress and fear could make memory better by
making the eyewitness more alert or that the emotion
will somehow help the eyewitness form a clear and
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lasting memory [3]. However, research does not
support this contention, indicating instead that stress
impairs the formation of memories needed for accu-
rate identification decisions from lineups [4]. Simi-
larly, the use of weapons visible to the eyewitness
draws attentional focus to the weapon and detracts
from processing of the face of the perpetrator [5].
Another factor that affects eyewitness identification
performance is whether the eyewitness and the culprit
are of the same or different race or ethnic background.
Research has consistently shown that it is more diffi-
cult to recognize a stranger who was viewed on only
one prior occasion if that person was of a different
racial or ethnic appearance than the witness [6].
Relative Judgments
Having a weak memory per se, however, does not
fully explain why eyewitnesses make mistaken iden-
tifications from lineups. In particular, having a weak
memory does not explain why a witness would make
a positive identification rather than simply saying “I
don’t know.” A dominant conceptualization among
eyewitness scientists is that eyewitnesses are moti-
vated to make an identification (in the interests of
justice) and sometimes rely on a “relative-judgment
process” rather than on absolute recognition to make
the identification decision [7]. A relative judgment is
one in which the eyewitness compares each lineup
member to the other lineup members and decides
which one more closely resembles his/her memory
relative to the other lineup members.
The relative-judgment strategy can lead to an accu-
rate identification if the actual perpetrator is in the
lineup. However, if the actual perpetrator is not
in the lineup, then relying on a relative-judgment
strategy increases the risk of misidentifying an inno-
cent suspect. Although there are no empirically
determined estimates of how often perpetrator-absent
lineups are shown to witnesses in actual cases, the
absence of the actual perpetrator in the lineup is not
necessarily an unusual situation. It simply means that
the person-of-interest (the suspect) is not the perpe-
trator and that the investigation has focused on the
wrong person.
The rate of perpetrator-absent lineups in actual
cases cannot be easily represented by a single base
rate or percentage. Instead, the rate of perpetrator-
absent lineups is likely to vary from one case to
another and one jurisdiction to another, depending
on how much or little evidence the detectives feel
that they need in order to conduct a lineup [8].
Jurisdictions that are quick to assemble a lineup on
the basis of mere hunches would be expected to run a
higher rate of perpetrator-absent lineups than would
jurisdictions that require good evidence against the
suspect before conducting a lineup.
Experiments on the relative-judgment process
have shown that when the actual perpetrator is
removed from a lineup, witnesses shift their iden-
tifications to another lineup member rather than
rejecting the lineup or saying “I don’t know” [9].
This phenomenon is especially pronounced when
witness’s memories for the perpetrator are weak.
Accordingly, researchers have investigated ways to
decrease witnesses’ reliance on relative judgments
when making identification decisions. One strategy
is to present the lineup members to eyewitnesses
sequentially (one-by-one) rather than simultaneously
(all at once). This sequential presentation method
helps curb witnesses’ propensities to make positive
identifications based on relative judgments and
instead promotes absolute recognition judgments. As
a result, the sequential lineup method reduces the
risk of mistaken identification but it can also reduce
identifications of the guilty party [10].
Another method for curbing eyewitnesses’ propen-
sities to make positive identifications is to warn
eyewitnesses before viewing the lineup that the actual
perpetrator might not be in the lineup. This prelineup
warning has little effect on the eyewitness’s ability
to identify the perpetrator if the actual perpetrator is
in the lineup, but it reduces the risk of identifying an
innocent suspect if the actual perpetrator is not in the
lineup [11].
Lineup Composition
Another factor that contributes to mistaken identi-
fication is the use of lineup fillers who fail to fit
the eyewitness’s description of the perpetrator, which
leads the eyewitness to prefer the suspect (who fits the
description) even when the suspect is not the perpe-
trator [12]. Consider a case, for instance, in which the
eyewitness described the perpetrator as a tall man
in his 20s with short dark hair and no facial hair.
Suppose that the suspect fits that description, but the
fillers were short, or had light-colored hair, or had
long hair, or were in their 40s, or had facial hair.
This would make the suspect stand out in the lineup
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as being the person that the investigators obviously
believe committed the crime.
A technique called the mock witness procedure has
been developed by eyewitness scientists to assess
such lineup biases. Mock witnesses are people who
have never previously seen the suspect and are
simply given the eyewitness’s verbal description of
the perpetrator. The mock witnesses then view the
lineup (or a photo of it) and select the person they
believe most closely matches the description provided
by the eyewitness. A fair six-person lineup should
result in only 1/6 of the mock witnesses picking
the suspect and the remaining 5/6 of the witnesses
selecting fillers. The inverse of these ratios (e.g.,
inverse of 1/6= 6) is known as functional lineup size
[13]. Hence, if 1/3 of the mock witnesses pick the
suspect, the functional size of the lineup would be 3,
even if the nominal size (number of persons in the
lineup) was 6, 8, or 10. The higher the functional size,
the more it is presumed to be protective of mistaken
identifications of an innocent suspect.
Influence of Lineup Administrator
Another factor that can cause mistaken identifications
from lineups is the behavior of the person who
administers the lineup. The common practice is for
the case detective to administer the lineup [14].
That means that the lineup administrator knows
very well which lineup member is suspected of
committing the crime and which lineup members
are merely fillers. Eyewitness scientists have argued
that this practice creates considerable opportunity for
the lineup administrator to influence the eyewitness.
Experimental simulations have shown that lineup
administrators influence eyewitness identifications in
a manner consistent with what the administrator is
led to believe about which person is the suspect
[15]. The precise ways in which this influence occurs
are not yet well established, but they appear to be
very similar to the experimenter-expectancy effect in
which the results of an experiment are influenced by
the expectations of the experimenter who tests the
research participants [16]. Accordingly, eyewitness
scientists have advocated for the use of double-blind
lineups [9, 17] in which the person administering the
lineup does not know which person is the suspect and
which are fillers [18].
False Confidence
A lineup results in two primary outcomes: the
identification itself and the confidence that the
eyewitness expresses in the identification. The
confidence expressed by the eyewitness is important
because tentative or low-confidence identifications
are usually not considered strong evidence, often do
not result in charges, and tend to be unpersuasive
to judges and juries. A confident eyewitness, in
contrast, is very persuasive [19]. Hence, eyewitness
scientists have devoted a great deal of research to
investigate the strength of the correlation between
eyewitness identification confidence and eyewitness
identification accuracy.
As might be expected, the strength of the relation
between confidence and accuracy varies considerably
across studies as a function of numerous variables. A
meta-analysis of 30 different studies indicated that
the average correlation might be as high as r= 0.41
[20]. That means that accuracy is accounting for a
maximum of only about 16% of the variance across
eyewitnesses in their confidence.
The concept of false confidence refers to a highly
confident eyewitness who has nevertheless made a
mistaken identification. False confidence can occur
for a variety of reasons, including the obvious situa-
tion in which an innocent person who was identified
happens to have very high coincidental resemblance
to the culprit. More interesting, however, is the
phenomenon of “confidence malleability” in which a
mistaken eyewitness who was initially low in confi-
dence later becomes highly confident.
Evidence for confidence malleability has been
shown dramatically with the postidentification feed-
back effect. After making mistaken identifications,
eyewitnesses who are given feedback suggesting that
they identified the right person (e.g., “Good, you
identified the actual suspect”) undergo a distortion
in their memory about their initial uncertainty and
come to believe that they were confident all along
[21]. The postidentification feedback effect has been
demonstrated across a variety of experiments [22].
Recent research shows that feedback eliminates an
otherwise reliable ability of evaluators to differentiate
between accurate and mistaken identification testi-
mony [23]. Hence, feedback can thwart the abilities
of fact-finders to make accurate judgments in cases
involving eyewitness-identification evidence.
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